Party Politics in Nigeria and the Electoral Prospects of the All Progressives Congress in 2027: A Political Economy Analysis by Olugbesan Idris, Ph.D

Introduction

The study of party politics in Nigeria demands an analytical approach that transcends descriptive institutionalism and engages deeply with the structural underpinnings of power, distribution, and elite coordination. Since the advent of the Fourth Republic in 1999, Nigeria has exhibited the formal attributes of electoral democracy while simultaneously sustaining informal practices rooted in patronage, identity, and elite bargaining. This duality renders the Nigerian case particularly fertile for the application of political economy and political science theories.

At the center of this analysis lies the question of whether the All Progressives Congress (APC), as the incumbent ruling party, can reproduce its presidential dominance in the 2027 elections. While conventional electoral analysis might emphasize voter preferences or campaign dynamics, a more sophisticated approach situates electoral outcomes within deeper structural logics—what Richard Joseph conceptualized as prebendal politics, and what subsequent scholars have reframed through theories of clientelism, neopatrimonialism, and political settlements.

This article advances a three-part argument. First, it examines the structural foundations of Nigeria’s party system through the lenses of prebendalism, weak institutionalization, and neopatrimonial governance. Second, it interrogates the dynamics of elite coordination, clientelist exchange, and incumbency advantage that shape electoral competition. Third, it explores emerging pressures—economic, sociological, and institutional—that may recalibrate the balance of power ahead of 2027. Together, these perspectives provide a theoretically grounded assessment of the APC’s prospects within Nigeria’s evolving political order.

Part I: Structural Foundations of Party Politics in Nigeria

The architecture of Nigeria’s party system is best understood as a product of historical institutional trajectories and resource-dependent state formation. Paul Pierson notion of path dependence is particularly instructive: institutional arrangements established during military rule—especially fiscal centralization and executive dominance—have generated self-reinforcing dynamics that persist into the democratic era.

Within this structure, political competition is less about ideological differentiation and more about access to state-controlled resources. Joseph’s Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria (1987) remains the canonical text for understanding this phenomenon. Public office, in this view, is treated as a prebend—an entitlement to be exploited for personal and group benefit. Importantly, prebendalism is not merely corruption; it is an organizing principle of political life.

This logic is reinforced by what Nicolas van de Walle describes in African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis (2001) as neopatrimonialism: the coexistence of formal bureaucratic institutions with informal patron-client networks. In Nigeria, parties function as vehicles for mediating these networks rather than as programmatic organizations.

The weakness of party institutionalization further accentuates this dynamic. Drawing on Scott Mainwaring framework in Building Democratic Institutions (1995), Nigeria exhibits high electoral volatility, weak societal roots for parties, and low ideological coherence. Yet, as Kanchan Chandra argues in Why Ethnic Parties Succeed (2004), such fluidity is not necessarily pathological; it reflects rational adaptation to a context where identity and patronage dominate political mobilization.

The APC itself is emblematic of this structure. Formed as a coalition of opposition forces, it lacks ideological unity but compensates through organizational flexibility and elite inclusivity. Its continued dominance thus depends less on institutional depth than on its ability to navigate and reproduce the underlying political economy.

Part II: Elite Coordination, Clientelism, and Incumbency Advantage

If the first layer of analysis is structural, the second is strategic—centered on how political actors operate within these constraints. Here, rational choice institutionalism and elite theory provide critical insights.

From the perspective of Douglass North Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990), parties serve as coordination mechanisms that reduce uncertainty in elite interactions. Nigerian politics can thus be understood as a series of bargaining games among elites seeking to maximize access to state resources. The APC’s formation in 2013 represented a successful coordination equilibrium; its survival depends on maintaining that equilibrium.

However, as Mancur Olson demonstrates in The Logic of Collective Action (1965), large coalitions are inherently unstable. Distributional conflicts, free-rider problems, and leadership rivalries generate persistent centrifugal pressures. Within the APC, issues such as zoning, succession, and resource allocation are potential flashpoints that could destabilize the coalition ahead of 2027.

Clientelism further shapes these dynamics at the mass level. Herbert Kitschelt Patrons, Clients, and Policies (2007) highlights how broker-mediated exchanges structure voter-party relationships. In Nigeria, local intermediaries distribute targeted benefits in exchange for electoral support, creating a dense web of reciprocal obligations.

The APC’s incumbency significantly enhances its capacity to sustain these networks. Under Bola Ahmed Tinubu, the party controls federal resources, administrative institutions, and agenda-setting mechanisms. This aligns with the broader literature on incumbency advantage, which emphasizes the strategic benefits of resource access and institutional leverage.

Yet, incumbency is a double-edged sword. As Mushtaq Khan political settlements framework suggests, maintaining elite cohesion requires continuous redistribution. Economic constraints—particularly declining fiscal space—may undermine the APC’s ability to satisfy competing demands, thereby increasing the risk of elite defection.

Part III: Emerging Pressures and the Reconfiguration of Electoral Competition

While structural advantages and strategic coordination favor the APC, emerging pressures introduce significant uncertainty into the 2027 equation. These pressures operate across economic, sociological, and informational dimensions.

Economically, Nigeria faces what can be conceptualized through Joseph Schumpeter The Crisis of the Tax State (1918): a tension between revenue generation and political legitimacy. The erosion of oil rents and macroeconomic instability constrain the state’s distributive capacity. In turn, Albert Hirschman Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970) suggests that both elites and citizens may respond through defection or dissent if material expectations are unmet.

Sociologically, shifts in voter behavior complicate traditional clientelist models. Ronald Inglehart work on value change points to the growing importance of non-material considerations, particularly among younger and urban voters. While Nigeria’s context remains distinct, there is evidence of increasing political awareness and issue-based mobilization, especially in urban centers.

Technologically, digital platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have transformed the informational landscape. These platforms reduce the informational asymmetries that historically favored incumbents, enabling opposition actors to mobilize and coordinate more effectively. However, they also provide tools for incumbents to shape narratives and manage dissent.

Finally, institutional and security dynamics remain critical. Drawing on Max Weber conception of the state, the capacity to maintain order and legitimacy is central to political authority. Electoral credibility, judicial interventions, and security conditions will all influence the 2027 outcome.

Conclusion

A theoretically grounded analysis of party politics in Nigeria reveals a complex interplay between structural constraints, strategic agency, and emergent pressures. The APC enters the 2027 electoral cycle with significant advantages rooted in incumbency, elite coordination, and the enduring logic of prebendal distribution. These advantages are reinforced by path-dependent institutional arrangements and a fragmented opposition landscape.

Yet, these same dynamics generate vulnerabilities. Economic constraints threaten the sustainability of patronage networks; intra-elite competition risks coalition fragmentation; and evolving voter expectations introduce new uncertainties into electoral behavior.

In sum, the APC’s prospects in 2027 are best understood not as predetermined, but as contingent upon its ability to navigate Nigeria’s intricate political economy. The election will serve as a critical juncture, testing whether the party can reproduce its dominance within a system that is simultaneously resilient and unstable—structured by history, shaped by strategy, and open to transformation.

Bad behaviour does not fare well under exposure. People, institutions, and systems tend to be at their best when the spotlight is on them. A United States Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandeis, captured the power of transparency aptly when he observed in a 1913 article that “sunlight is said to be the best disinfectant; electric light the most efficient policeman.”

Transparency, like sunlight, exposes. Bad behaviour that prefers to remain unseen either falls in line or risks public embarrassment. Information, when placed in the hands of the public, empowers them. For businesses, it deters them from conduct that is unbecoming, because few welcome sustained scrutiny that ultimately damages their reputation.

The telecommunications industry is no exception. The regulatory approach adopted by the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) to proactively disclose information—bringing clear and easy-to-understand information to the public domain—is reshaping how consumers, operators, and investors perceive the sector.

Traditionally, regulation in the industry leaned heavily on a punitive, command-and-control model. The regulator made the rules, enforced them, and wielded the whip to keep operators in line. But with well over a thousand licensed operators, the whips were never going to go around. One must also pose the question: do whips truly inspire better behaviour? But that is a subject for another conversation.

In a competitive environment as we have in telecommunications, operators are driven by the need to outperform one another. They compete for subscribers, promote attractive bonuses, and roll out sleek tariff offerings. When this competition plays out in an open and transparent field—where accurate, timely, and comparable information is available—consumers ultimately benefit, and operators are incentivised to improve.

Take an example from late 2024, when the NCC concluded an audit of the national telecoms subscriber database following the implementation of the Federal Government’s NIN–SIM linkage policy. Over 60 million lines were removed from the system. The regulator did not attempt to massage the numbers or obscure the reality. The facts, though stark, were presented plainly. Operators were confronted with their true subscriber figures, and the signal was unmistakable: it was time to sit up. Operators immediately began to develop and deploy strategies to get more subscribers—both lost and new ones—to their network.

Sunlight, indeed, does two things—it brightens, and it heats. Both can be uncomfortable if they hit you unprepared.

The NCC’s directive mandating mobile network operators and major Internet service providers to notify consumers of significant service disruptions and planned maintenance aligns squarely with this transparency and accountability ethos. In the same vein, the NCC last year launched a Major Network Outage Incident Reporting Portal on its website. On this platform, operators now report major outages they face, their causes, affected areas, and restoration timelines.

Sometime in 2025, the NCC introduced its Guidelines on Corporate Governance for the telecommunications industry. The framework mandates operators in the sector to have stronger board composition and effectiveness. It enhances compliance and ethical standards and demands more robust risk management and audit practices in the sector. Crucially, it advances transparency and accountability across the sector. Operators are now required to submit mid-year and annual compliance reports detailing adherence to governance standards, ethical obligations, and risk management practices. The Guidelines strengthen public trust, bolster investor confidence, and preserves the integrity of the industry.

Further deepening this transparency drive, the NCC, in partnership with Ookla, began publishing quarterly operators’ network performance reports in October 2025. These reports benchmark quality of service and quality of experience across operators. They also provide insights into network capacity, 5G opportunities, and device performance.

Similarly, the NCC has launched its National Coverage Maps. The maps allow consumers to visualise network coverage, speeds, and service availability across the country.

Taken together, these measures place the industry in the public glare—open to scrutiny and assessment. For consumers, they are enabled to make more informed choices about networks and tariffs. For operators, transparency in the industry imposes a new era where performance is visible, shortcomings are exposed, and accountability is no longer abstract. To protect their brands and market positions, operators must now resolve network challenges more quickly, communicate more honestly, and deliver better service.

Investors take transparency in Nigeria’s telecommunications industry seriously. For them, it signals regulatory predictability and reduced uncertainty—conditions that give investors the confidence to commit capital to the sector.

Perhaps most importantly, this openness helps rebuild public trust in Nigeria’s telecommunications sector.

It is unsurprising that the Presidential Enabling Business Environment Council (PEBEC) ranked the NCC among the top five Federal Government agencies for transparency and efficiency in 2025. The ranking affirmed that the Commission’s effort to place the industry under public scrutiny was being felt—and seen.

The Executive Vice Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the NCC, Dr. Aminu Maida, captured the moment succinctly: “This recognition is an affirmation of the values that guide our work: transparency, accountability, and an unwavering commitment to regulatory excellence. It signals that the reforms we have pursued, the systems we have strengthened, and the decisions we have taken are yielding the right results.”

There are still gaps the industry must close. Yet this approach—proactive disclosure, borderless transparency, and consistent accountability—clearly places the NCC on the right path to addressing both long-standing and emerging challenges in the telecommunications sector.

Darkness preserves the status quo. Turning on the light sets reform in motion. By ensuring tariff clarity, publishing real-time coverage maps, making network performance and operator ratings public, and enforcing a corporate governance framework rooted in accountability, the NCC is cultivating a culture in which the lights remain on. Competition is sharpened, performance becomes non-negotiable, and underperformance has nowhere to hide.

Johannes Wojuola, is the Special Adviser to the EVC/CEO, NCC, on Communication and Media. He writes from Abuja.

The Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) is planning to launch a cross-sector platform that will allow financial and security regulators to track recycled phone numbers to prevent fraud linked to SIM card reassignment.

The details of the plan were contained in a document provided to our reporters last week.

Known as the telecoms identity risk management system (TIRMS), the portal is expected to be launched by the end of March.

The portal is NCC’s solution to tackling issues related to SIM recycling, such as users receiving text messages meant for previous owners, or being investigated for offences allegedly committed by former users of those numbers.

According to the document, the above challenges are said to present issues of security and integrity of phone number ownership, especially as NCC’s churn policy now interacts more with other industries.

The agency said the portal will collect and share data on churned (recycled) mobile numbers and numbers flagged for fraudulent activities across sectors.

“The NCC has addressed this challenge by developing a cross-sector platform called the Telecom Identity Risk Management System (TIRMS) Portal that collects and shares data on churned (recycled) phone numbers as well as numbers that have been flagged as having been used for fraudulent activities, as reported by other sector regulators,” the document reads.

“The goal is to prevent the misuse of numbers when they change hands. The information on this platform will be made available to relevant stakeholders across various sectors.
“It is worth noting that this requires significant dialogue as KYC needs of different sectors vary and need to interact properly.”

The document said the platform, which has been built and tested with telecoms operators, will be hosted by the commission but made accessible to key stakeholders, including the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), pension regulators, the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC), and security agencies.

It said a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the CBN is being finalised to operationalise the system upon launch, adding that the platform, whose development began in March 2024, will go live after the conclusion of consultations with relevant stakeholders.

It is understood that the NCC has commenced amendments to the quality of service (QoS) regulations of 2024 and the registration of communications subscribers regulations of 2022 to support the deployment of TIRMS.

“A consultation on the proposed amendments to the Business Rules of the Quality of Service Regulations 2024 and the Registration of Communications Subscribers Regulations 2022 is currently underway and is expected to be concluded before the end of March 2026,” the NCC document said.

“Upon completion of the review, the revised rules will provide for the notification of line owners whose numbers are about to be churned, using alternative contact channels within a specified timeframe prior to the disconnection.”

“The amendments will also establish the regulatory framework for warehousing churned numbers within TIRMS, enable controlled access for relevant sectors, and create clear procedures for blocking numbers that have been implicated in fraudulent activities.”

It added that subscribers who wish to retain unused numbers can utilise the “line parking” provision under the QoS business rules, which allows a line to be preserved for one year at a minimal cost to prevent it from being classified as inactive.